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Book Review
Robespierre Meets The Foreign Tax Credit:
Reflections on Piketty’s “Capital in the
Twenty-First Century” and the
Contemporary Tax Policy Debate
By Michael A. Livingston*
There is a scene in Citizens, Simon Schama’s book on the French
Revolution, in which an aristocrat disguises himself as a sans culotte and
orders breakfast at a working-class tavern during the Reign of Terror.
The aristocrat orders an omelette. “How many eggs?” asks the chef, already somewhat suspicious. (The average working-class omelette contained perhaps two or three eggs.) The aristocrat thinks for a moment
and names an amount that seems normal from his own experience. A
dozen eggs, he says. Within seconds he is identified as an enemy of the
revolution and makes a one-way trip to the guillotine.1
Inequality is, inevitably, a matter of perspective: it will always seem
more obvious to those who have less than to those who have more. Yet
inequality is notoriously difficult to quantify. Should it be measured on
the basis of income, or should it also reflect wealth? What about intangibles, like educational advantages or personal connections? And
what should be the role of redistribution – i.e., the reduction of inequality – in framing tax and other public policy debates? Do poor people
really care about inequality, or is it (as Schama himself suggests of the
French Revolution2) frequently an argument by which one elite attempts to displace another?
For a generation or more, public policy has been dominated by efficiency concerns, and fairness or “vertical equity” has taken a back seat.
But there are signs of change all around. President Obama has paid at
least verbal homage to the need to reduce inequality,3 while local politi* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. A.B. 1977 Cornell; J.D. 1981 Yale.
Thanks to Phil Harvey and Dan Shaviro for comments and encouragement on this
project.
1 SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 856
(1989).
2 See, e.g., id. at 727-28.
3 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 310 (Arthur
Goldhammer, trans., 2014).
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cians, notably the mayor of New York City, have been still more aggressive.4 The Occupy Wall Street movement, though politically feeble, has
proven rhetorically powerful: its favored slogan, pitting an alleged
ninety-nine percent of the population against a small number of fat cats,
has been especially resilient. Even the Tea Party, while conservative on
social issues, has adopted an anti-elitist tone, complaining of corporate
bailouts and demanding more attention to the average voter.5 Populist
presidents like Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt have been the
subjects of best-selling biographies, and the parallel to the Progressive
Era has been noted by numerous observers.
It was probably inevitable that someone would write a book that
served as the Bible of this new progressive movement, and now someone has. Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, a 577page work supported by lengthy footnotes and an extensive online appendix, has risen to the top of the bestseller lists and provoked unprecedented attention in newspapers, magazines, and the broader culture.
That Piketty is a somewhat obscure French professor who peppers his
book with abstract economic equations and quotes the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen appears to have enhanced, rather than
reduced, his popularity. A series of attacks on his conclusions and
methodology, which were somewhat forced in nature and which Piketty
has rather easily fended off, have contributed further to his celebrity.6
It is as if Thomas Paine, or perhaps Karl Marx, were suddenly reborn
and began appearing in radio and television interviews: you could like
him or dislike him, but nobody could pretend he wasn’t there.
4 See Michael M. Grynbaum, Taking Office, de Blasio Vows to Fix Inequity, N.Y.
T IMES (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/nyregion/bill-de-blasioinauguration.html.
5 See generally Eric Jackson, Part III of Interview with Chrystia Freeland on the
Global Elites, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericjackson/2011/04/
28/part-iii-of-interview-with-chrystia-freeland-on-the-global-elites/.
6 See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Thomas Piketty Responds to Criticisms of His Data, N.Y.
TIMES (MAY 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/upshot/thomas-piketty-responds-to-criticism-of-his-data.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1; Neil Irwin, Did Thomas
Piketty Get His Math Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
05/24/upshot/did-piketty-get-his-math-wrong.html?abt=0002&abg=1. For more nuanced
critiques of the book, see Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded Age, N. Y. REV. OF
BOOKS (May 8, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/may/08/thomaspiketty-new-gilded-age/ (generally sympathetic but finding Piketty’s treatment of wages
less convincing than that of capital); Lawrence H. Summers, The Inequality Puzzle, DEMOCRACY: J. OF IDEAS (Summer 2014), at 91, available at http://www.democracyjournal
.org/pdf/33/the_inequality_puzzle.pdf (crediting Piketty with raising important issues but
skeptical of his broader theoretical conclusions). For a tax law perspective, see Leigh
Osofsky, The IRS as a Tax Law Nonenforcer, JOTWELL (Dec. 17, 2014), http://tax.jot
well.com/the-irs-as-tax-law-nonenforcer/.
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Piketty’s arguments regarding the increasing concentration of
wealth and income, and the likelihood that that concentration will accelerate further in the coming decades, are clearly stated and (in my view)
by and large convincing. By contrast, his policy proposals are tentative
and somewhat unsophisticated in nature. His principal suggestion, a
global progressive tax on capital accumulations, is by his own admission
utopian.7 Domestic tax changes tend to be incremental in nature, and
are relatively easy for those in the top income brackets to avoid. Indeed, because taxes tend to reach earned income more effectively than
accumulated capital, they might actually make things worse. There is,
moreover, a sense that Piketty, while a master of economic argument, is
less comfortable with the moral variety: although he discusses meritocracy and the “moral hierarchy of wealth,”8 these are peripheral to
his main argument, and his political and cultural assumptions are, not
surprisingly, European rather than American in orientation.
This book review considers Piketty’s argument in the context of the
existing public policy debate and, more specifically, the debate over tax
fairness and progressivity in the United States and other countries.9 It is
less a review of Piketty’s book – there will be no shortage of these –
than a reflection on the current state of the tax policy discussion and
what Piketty might, or might not, contribute to it. I will range freely
between the book and previous scholarship, asking how Piketty might
respond to hypothetical facts and arguments and how other scholars,
living or dead, might respond to him. My definition of “tax policy” will
be a broad one, including popular opinion and political movements as
well as the work of law and economics professors. At times, I will move
outside taxation altogether to consider education, health care, or other
social policy arenas that are relevant to the inequality problem. But the
focus – for me as it is for Piketty – will remain on the tax problem.
A book review is too short to require an executive summary. Suffice it to say that, while I am generally convinced by Piketty’s argument
about inequality, I am somewhat more skeptical regarding the ability of
tax policy, on its own, to correct it. In particular, I am skeptical that
taxation can correct the profound social, cultural, and other
noneconomic inequality that currently exists in the United States and
other countries; these inequalities correlate to a degree with economic
injustice but are to a significant degree independent of it. I am likewise
concerned that progressive taxation is, or is becoming, a convenient way
for the socially and culturally privileged – including many in the educa7 See PIKETTY, supra note 3, at 515. See also Paul L. Caron, Thomas Piketty and
Inequality: Legal Causes and Tax Solutions, 64 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2073 (2015).
8 See id. at 443-47.
9 See infra Part II.
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tional establishment – to avoid taking responsibility for their own not
inconsiderable advantages. This does not mean that Piketty’s proposals
are wrong, but it does counsel a healthy degree of caution, a caution that
will be a prevailing theme of this essay.
Part I of the essay summarizes Piketty’s principal arguments and his
main tax proposals. Part II discusses the current state of the progressivity debate and Piketty’s possible contribution to it. Part III considers
the limitations of a tax approach and what a broader, more comprehensive assault on inequality might look like.
I
While his documentation is extensive, Piketty’s argument is fairly
simple. For most of history, he argues, returns to capital have exceeded
the growth rate of the economy, so that (over time) both income and
wealth tend to become concentrated in a smaller and smaller number of
people.10 Because of an unprecedented series of political and economic
shocks – two World Wars, the Great Depression, the Cold War and associated threat of communism – this momentum was somewhat reversed
in the middle of the twentieth century, with the result that inequality
modestly declined and earned income, rather than return on investments, became a more important part of the economic equation.11
Since approximately 1980, a combination of conservative economic
policies, reduced population growth, and the inherent logic of capitalism
has caused the older dynamic to return so that inequality is again on the
increase, and economic success is becoming ever more dependent on
inheritance than inherent talent.12 To people who grew up during and
after World War II, this situation seems anomalous, and there is an expectation that more balanced growth and greater equality will sooner or
later return, perhaps once the benefits of computers and other new technologies have spread more evenly across the population.13 In fact, argues Piketty, it is the “baby boom” experience that is historically
exceptional, and the current pattern will likely continue or even accelerate in coming decades unless corrective action is taken.14
10

See PIKETTY, supra note 3, at 1, 336.
See id. at 41, 237, 275, 397.
12 See id. at 42, 294-95.
13 See id. at 380-81.
14 See id. This has been but a brief summary of a sophisticated, nuanced, and (even
in English translation) beautifully written argument, so much so that the reader is occasionally fearful of being swept up in assumptions and conclusions that he might or might
not agree with if less cogently presented. To Piketty’s credit, he provides all of his raw
data in the form of a massive electronic appendix, so that – even if one does ultimately
reject his arguments – the facts are there for others to re-interpret them. This appendix is
11
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Piketty is French, and the patterns he identifies are particularly
strong in a European (and especially a French) context. In particular,
the economic shocks caused by the two world wars were somewhat muffled in the United States, which was never defeated and occupied and
did not suffer the loss of overseas empire on the Anglo-French model.
Yet inequality in the United States – historically less dramatic than Europe – is now significantly worse, and public policy is if anything less
inclined to reverse it. There is a difference in kinds of inequality, the
American version tending to result as much from excessively high incomes as from returns on capital (the so-called rentier phenomenon).15
But this is at best a mixed blessing: high incomes bring with them a
sense of moral superiority that makes people less likely to accept redistributive measures, and high earners themselves turn into investors
within one or two generations, so that the problem merely recreates itself on another level.16 In this respect – and given the heightened ability
of capital to cross borders and avoid taxation – the situation may actually be worse than it was a century ago.
What should be done to correct this situation? Piketty’s first choice
is a global tax on capital (effectively property) accumulations, something like the property taxes currently imposed by American local governments, except that it would be progressive in nature and include all
types of property (businesses, financial assets, etc.) rather than being
limited to real estate or other specified assets.17 He suggests initial rates
of 0% on the first =
C 1 million of assets, 1% on the next =
C 1 million to =
C5
million, and 2% thereafter – rather a heavy hit, since (unlike an estate
or gift tax) the tax would be imposed every year – although he seems to
recognize that this is improbable under current conditions.18 As a
fallback, he suggests that a capital tax might be imposed within the European Union, or perhaps at a more nominal rate, which would raise
less revenue but still serve an information-gathering function.19 In this
and other matters he is influenced by the French Revolution, in the aftermath of which France imposed a series of low-rate taxes that – while
accomplishing relatively little redistribution – gathered a vast amount of
available at http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capital21c/en/Piketty2014FiguresTablesLinks
.pdf.
15 See id. at 439-43.
16 See id. Somewhat wickedly, Piketty cites the paradigm of American meritocracy,
Microsoft’s Bill Gates, and L’Oreal heiress Liliane Bettencourt as examples of this phenomenon. Piketty notes that Gates’s fortune increased from $4 billion to $50 billion between 1990 and 2010, and that the fortune of Bettencourt, “who never worked a day in
her life,” grew at the same rate. Id.
17 See id. at 515-18.
18 See id. at 515-18, 528.
19 See id. at 528.
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data that helped build the case for further legislation and indeed forms
the basis for much of Piketty’s own study.20
Although emphasizing his proposed capital tax, Piketty is not shy
about expressing opinions on other issues. Not surprisingly, he favors
progressive income taxation, although he is skeptical of its ability to deal
with the concentration of wealth and capital in an increasingly globalized world.21 (This is one of the reasons that he supports a capital tax.)
He is likewise a supporter of the European-style social welfare state,
although he recognizes that public spending cannot continue to grow at
the rate it has in the past; the trick is to use existing money more effectively rather than to gather more of it.22 Like Paul Krugman of the New
York Times, Piketty reserves a particular scorn for austerity programs,
especially in a European context: his description of the Cyprus financial
crisis, which was exacerbated by external intervention, is alone worth
the price of admission.23
Reaction to the book has been more or less predictable. Liberals
have hailed it as something approaching a revelation, although some (including Krugman) have found aspects of it incomplete.24 An early attack on its methodology, largely in the pages of financial magazines,
seems to have done little permanent damage.25 A more significant disagreement concerns Piketty’s theoretical conclusions, specifically his suggestion that returns on capital inevitably, or almost inevitably, exceed
the rate of economic growth (r > g).26 Much of this disagreement concerns assumptions about capital markets and the relationship of labor
and capital that are only partially susceptible to empirical proof. As the
book is digested by the economic community, there will be additional
criticisms, although the analytic core of the book – specifically the conclusion of rising inequality – seems likely to stand the test of time.
II
If popular response to Piketty has been “Wow!” the response of tax
scholars is likely to be, “What else is new?” Declining progressivity and
increasing inequality – of which declining progressivity is both cause and
(to some degree) effect – have indeed been the starting point of the tax
20

See id. at 28-30, 532.
See id. at 515-16.
22 See id. at 481-83.
23 See id. at 519, 553-56.
24 See Daniel Shaviro, The Return of Capital, JOTWELL (July 8, 2014), http://tax.jot
well.com/?wptouch_view=normal&wptouch_redirect_nonce. . .&wptouch_redirect=%2F
should-we-tax-the-rich-or-leave-them-alone%2F; see Krugman, supra note 6.
25 See sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
26 See Krugman, supra note 6.
21
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debate for some time now. Yet how to address this problem is a difficult
question, rather more so than Piketty’s book would suggest.
To understand the tax debate, one must go back two generations.
The classic American work on the subject, Blum and Kalven’s The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, was written in the 1950s.27 In their
article (later book28), Blum and Kalven identify three principal arguments for tax progressivity. The first, which has become known as the
declining marginal utility of money (DMUM) argument, states that people with high incomes derive less benefit (utility) from their last dollar
of income than those with low or moderate incomes.29 Taxing them at a
higher rate may thus raise additional money without significantly reducing the overall welfare of society. The second, the redistribution argument, suggests that progressive taxation is necessary to reduce
concentrations of wealth and improve the lives of those less talented or
simply less fortunate than those at the top of the economic pyramid.30
This argument is more emotionally appealing than DMUM, but also
more controversial, so that progressivity advocates (including Blum and
Kalven themselves) tend to be somewhat uncomfortable making it.
A third argument, known as the benefit theory, suggests that rich
people should pay more taxes because they benefit more from the services taxes provide.31 This argument has traditionally foundered on the
difficulty of proving who benefits from governmental activities, and
most scholars no longer give it much credence.
Together with the arguments for progressivity, Blum and Kalven
list a number of arguments against it. The most potent of these states
that individuals have the right to the fruits of their own labor and Government should not take them away from them.32 A related argument –
what a later author called “the ideology of barriers and deterrents” –
suggests that higher taxes will reduce the overall productivity of society
so that everyone will wind up poorer than they were before.33 Reviewing all of these arguments, Blum and Kalven conclude that the case for
27 Walter Blum & Harry Kalven Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952). Though many of Blum and Kalven’s arguments had been
made by earlier authors, their presentation is unsurpassed. See, e.g., EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1908); LOUIS SURET, THEORIE DE L’IMPOT PROGRESSIF (1910).
28 WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (1979).
29 Blum & Kalven, Jr., supra note 28, at 456-57.
30 See id. at 492-94.
31 See id. at 451-52.
32 See id. at 496 n.197a.
33 See id. at 437-38; LOUIS EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 57-58
(1961).
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progressivity is “stubborn but uneasy,” suggesting that the debate is
likely to continue without clear resolution for the foreseeable future.34
If the case for progressivity was uneasy in the 1950s, it has become
even more so in the intervening years.35 In part, this results from political trends, the reduction of taxes having become a conservative article
of faith since at least the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-89).36 In
part, it results from the globalization of economic life, and the fear that
high taxes will drive upper-income businesses and individuals to other
taxing jurisdictions.37 Since capital is (as a general rule) more mobile
than labor, globalization provides an incentive to tax the former less and
the latter more – pretty much the opposite of what Blum and Kalvenstyle progressivity would suggest.38 This is an especially important factor for corporate taxes, which raise less money than the individual income tax, but are an important part of the progressivity equation.39
In recent years a number of tax scholars have considered the fate of
progressive taxation in an increasingly globalized and (until recently)
increasingly conservative world. Not surprisingly, a growing proportion
of this debate concerns international issues. The work of Daniel
Shaviro, a domestic tax scholar who more recently turned to international matters, is an important case in point. In his book Fixing U.S.
International Taxation, Shaviro attempts to introduce (or more accurately, to reintroduce) distributive concerns into the international tax
debate, where they have historically played a rather limited role.40 The
current political debate on corporate “inversions” and other international tax reduction strategies is a further case in point.41
A second strand of scholarship concerns tax history and its implications for the current debate. Reaching backward rather than outward,
Ajay Mehrotra has considered the early history of progressive income
34

See Blum & Kalven Jr., supra note 28, at 519-20.
See generally, Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation, “Globalization,” and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX. REV. 731 (2000) (discussing
political and economic globalization events that have made progressivity even more difficult than it was in the 1950s).
36 See id. at 731, 746.
37 See id. at 742.
38 See id.
39 See generally id. (summarizing some of the reasons for the defensive posture of
progressivity advocated – at least until the past few years).
40 See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 1-4 (2014); see
also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, No Country is an Island: Is a Radical Rethinking of International Taxation Needed?, (U. Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper, Paper No. 380, 2014) (reviewing SHAVIRO, supra) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2389979.
41 See, e.g., James Mann, Corporate Inversions:A Symptom of a Larger Problem, The
Corporate Income Tax, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 521-22 (2004-2005).
35
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taxation and its relationship to broader historical trends.42 In his book,
Making the Modern American Fiscal State, Mehrotra traces the intersection of economic, political, social, and cultural considerations – including, but not limited to, the “Social Gospel” of the mainline Protestant
churches – that made the income tax possible.43 While noting the antiprogressive tax reaction of the postwar era, Mehrotra suggests that progressive taxation has demonstrated remarkable resilience and that even
today’s antitax advocates make their arguments in an intellectual and
political context established by the earlier reformers.44
Related to, but distinct from, the above point is the ongoing scholarship concerning the propriety and significance of estate and inheritance taxation. While opposition to the estate tax is frequently thought
of as a conservative cause, liberals too have been divided, weighing the
estate tax’s effect on families and individual liberty as well as its role in
reducing income concentrations.45 The somewhat ambivalent nature of
the debate is reflected in public policy: Congress has repeatedly renewed the estate tax while reducing its rates, increasing exemption
amounts, and revealing a studied indifference to a bevy of old and new
evasion techniques.46
The new directions above – internationalization, historicization,
and a renewed interest in the estate tax – supplement a continuing
stream of work on more traditional progressivity concerns, which has
slowed but never completely stopped. The relationship of tax progressivity to nontax concerns, including the work of nontax legal philosophers (Rawls, Dworkin, etc.) and the effect of taxes on women,
42 See generally AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL
STATE: LAW, POLITICS AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 1877-1929 (2013).
43 Id. at 77, 99.
44 Id. at 254. For a survey of American attitudes on progressive taxation, including
both pro- and anti-progressive views, see Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of
Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119 (1994).
Mehrotra and Kornhauser are loosely associated with a group of scholars who have attempted to inject, or re-inject, a political and social consciousness into what is at times a
rather dry, economics-dominated field, a movement that has at times been associated
with critical tax scholarship but has recently taken on the more academic sounding name
of fiscal sociology.
45 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation,
104 YALE L.J. 283, 290, 313, 323, 364-65 (1994); Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal
Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Reply to Professor McCaffery, 51
TAX L. REV. 363, 368, 378, 383 (1996). Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE
STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 81-84 (1999) (proposing that all Americans be granted an
$80,000 stake in early adulthood to be financed by an annual wealth tax and an additional
death payment for those able to afford it).
46 See McCaffery, supra note 45, at 304, 332; see also Alstott, supra note 45, at 39798.
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minorities, and other economically disadvantaged groups, are two important themes.47
To some extent, Piketty’s book serves as a reinforcement of the
traditional arguments in favor of tax progressivity. Yet it also suggests
some of the limitations of these arguments – or, at the very least, the
likelihood of their achieving practical success within the existing political framework. This is true in at least three different ways.
First, the book suggests that it will be difficult to achieve meaningful reduction of inequality by income taxation alone. If capital grows
faster than income – and if today’s high earners will quickly become
tomorrow’s capital owners – an income tax can at best slow down, but
never truly reverse, the accumulation of capital that is at the heart of the
inequality problem.48 This is, of course, the reason that Piketty proposes a global tax on capital in the first place.49 Some of the same effect
could presumably be achieved by a more robust estate tax – really a
once-in-a-lifetime property tax – or by more effective income taxation
of interest, dividends, and capital gains, both of which Piketty would
surely support. But these are precisely the taxes that tend to be leakiest
in nature, and Congress (not to say the American public) has shown
little inclination to make them less so.
Second, Piketty suggests that meaningful tax reform must take
place at the international rather than the domestic level.50 This is especially true of taxes on the top one percent – more likely, the top tenth or
even hundredth of that percent – who are the most able to move income
and capital between taxing jurisdictions.51 To be sure, Piketty is not the
first to recognize this problem: it is implicit in Shaviro’s work and (indeed) in all serious international tax scholarship during the last few decades.52 But Shaviro is talking about incremental changes, whereas
Piketty is talking about a small earthquake. The gap between them and
their ideas is a vast one.
Finally, there is the enormous political leap of faith that would be
required to make Piketty’s proposals a reality. Outside of Europe – and
perhaps even in Europe – there barely exists a language to discuss the
kinds of changes Piketty is envisioning, let alone the political will to
47 See, e.g., Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739,
774-82 (1995) (discussing nontax philosophers); Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and the
Obama Tax Plan, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 575, 575-76, 582 (2009) (discussing racial
implications).
48 See PIKETTY, supra note 3, at 439, 515-18.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 430-39.
51 See, e.g., id. at 521-24 (discussing how transparency can prevent the use of tax
havens).
52 See SHAVIRO, supra note 40, at 19, 46.
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make them a reality. This is no less true of traditional progressivity advocates, who have been trained to think in incremental and primarily
national terms, than of their conservative opponents. None of this
means that Piketty is wrong to make his proposals or is somehow wasting his time. There is always a time lag between the publication of seminal works and their impact on the political process (think of Uncle
Tom’s Cabin or Silent Spring, and more recently of climate change).
But there are powerful political and ideological forces conspiring against
Piketty’s proposals – forces that the concentration of wealth and power
he documents ironically make stronger – and the success of his approach, even among those most inclined to be sympathetic, is by no
means a foregone conclusion.
III
If Piketty faces difficulty convincing liberals as well as conservatives
to embrace his more radical proposals, it may be because they have
more of a stake in the existing system than many of them would prefer
to admit. One has to be careful of this analysis, because it can easily
degenerate into a “so’s your old man” argument that avoids the issues
altogether. (Some of the journalist critiques of Piketty as an “academic
elitist” have a bit of this flavor.) Yet there is some truth to the analysis,
one which Piketty’s own book recognizes at several key junctures. To
understand this point, it is worth a brief detour regarding the nature of
contemporary inequality and the difficulty tax systems have faced, so
far, in confronting it.
In 1988 John Langbein, an expert in trust and estate law, published
a relatively obscure article entitled The Twentieth-Century Revolution in
Family Wealth Transmission.53 Langbein argued that, before the twentieth century, family wealth typically consisted of land and financial assets
that were passed to children at the time of one’s death.54 In the twentieth century, by contrast, the most important assets consisted of human
capital, including education and (to a lesser extent) cultural and other
benefits that were typically consumed during the parents’ lifetime and
not easily susceptible to monetary valuation.55 Even when the parents
had substantial financial assets, these were increasingly consumed during their own lifetimes, either by direct consumption or by means of
pensions and similar arrangements.56 Although these factors were less
significant for the poor and working class (who did not hold significant
53 John Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988).
54 See id. at 725-26.
55 See id. at 736-38, 743-46.
56 See id. at 739-40.
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assets of any kind) and for the very rich (who continued to possess both
kind of assets), for those in the upper middle class – roughly, the top
one-third of the population – they were increasingly predominant.57
Langbein was primarily concerned with the decline of the estates
and trusts bar rather than with tax issues.58 But the implications of his
argument for estate (and by extension property) taxation are clear. If
inequality results primarily from inheritance, and if the principal form of
inheritance is not (or is not easily) subject to tax, taxation is likely to be
an ineffective means of combating inequality. In fairness, Piketty’s proposed tax would be imposed annually rather than on a once-in-a-lifetime basis, and would be aimed primarily at the top one percent of
taxpayers, whom Langbein at least partially excludes from his theory.
Piketty’s tax would also be global in nature and (presumably) more
leak-proof than the existing estate and gift levy.59 Yet even for the top
one percent, intangible advantages would appear to be as or more important than the tangible variety, and Piketty’s tax would have little or
no effect on them.
In an effort to bring Piketty’s arguments down to earth, I considered the likely effect of his proposals on a typical upper middle class
family, namely my own. My wife and I each work in the nonprofit sector and we have a combined income (earned and unearned) of around
$400,000, which as best as I can tell places us just outside the top one
percent of U.S. incomes. We have substantial pensions and other financial and nonfinancial assets, including a modest suburban home, which
for the sake of simplicity we will value at an aggregate of $2 million.
Our children attended a mix of public and private secondary and postsecondary institutions (the younger of the two is now entering college)
and appear, so far, to be in reasonably decent shape. We have no pets,
and I will leave the house immediately if we get one.
Piketty’s preferred suggestion is a tax of 0% on the first $1 million
of assets, 1% on the second million (which is in the $1-5 million range),
and so forth.60 Under this proposal – and assuming no exemption for
pension or other retirement plans – we would pay a tax of approxi57 See id. at 747-51. Piketty mentions the human capital problem, arguing that the
increased role of education does not mean that society has become more meritocratic,
but does not really address whether human capital is more or less important than tangible
assets, a question that is probably impossible to resolve definitively in any event. See
PIKETTY, supra note 3, at 419-20.
58 Langbein, supra note 53, at 722.
59 See generally PIKETTY, supra note 3, at 515-30.
60 Id. at 528. For the sake of convenience, I have assumed that dollars and euros
have an equivalent value. The actual conversion rate is approximately 1.10 dollars per
euro but the rate has fluctuated significantly in recent years and is likely to do so in the
future.
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mately $10,000 per year (1% on the second million), on a more or less
indefinite basis. This would be in addition to our existing income, property, and other taxes, again assuming that there was no reduction in
these taxes and that none of the taxes were deductible against the others
(all questionable assumptions, but let us permit this to pass for the
moment).
What effect would this new tax have upon us? No doubt it would
be frustrating and, depending upon the performance of our assets, might
significantly slow down or even reverse the growth in our retirement
portfolio. Perhaps it would encourage us to spend more money before it
was taxed. But would it meaningfully change our lifestyle, or the advantages that we and our children have over others less fortunate than us?
Not very much.
I say this not because I don’t think we are privileged, but because I
think the nature of that privilege consists far more of intangible, human
advantages than financial or other taxable assets. When one of our children had a medical problem, we were able to use our knowledge and
connections to place him in the best hospital and secure him the best
treatment, a difference that might easily have saved his life. When our
other child was not placed in a “gifted” program, we were able to argue
that he was indeed gifted and the school had simply misapplied the criteria. When it came time to choosing a college, we were able to sort
through the maze of misleading statistics and figure out which school, if
not the best for us, was still best for them. The aggregate effect of these
interventions, over the course of years and decades, constitutes the difference between success and failure or, at very least, between disastrous
failure and failure one can still overcome. Their significance cannot be
overstated, and few if any of them are subject to tax.
To be sure, many of these advantages correlate with money, and
some may be caused by it. For example, money (or access to health
insurance) obviously increases one’s medical choices, as well as the
range of available colleges and preparatory schools. Even here, the advantages are so deep-seated and structural in nature that it is hard to see
how anything less than a massive redistribution of wealth and income
would do much to change them. Certainly, a 1%, or even a 10%, tax
would have little immediate effect.
One can argue, of course, that Piketty’s tax proposals would not
come in a vacuum. Money raised by his tax would presumably be used
to pay for better education, housing, and health care, especially for
those who now receive less of them. And the people who support
higher taxes would likely also argue for better treatment of women, a
more forceful response to climate change, and other progressive causes.
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The problem is that each of these issues is primarily local in character, and involves social, cultural, and religious values that are only partially, if at all, determined by income levels. Many of the people who
support higher taxes would, I suspect, be aghast at the abolition of
“gifted classes,” or if they were denied a role in choosing their children’s
colleges or summer camps. Yet these are precisely the areas in which
structural inequality lies.
One of the most entertaining parts of Capital in the Twenty-First
Century is its treatment of educational institutions. Many academics,
including Piketty himself, support social justice and redistribution of income. But their actual behavior is rather different. Thus, academic institutions follow aggressive investment strategies including extractive
industries, hedge funds, and other investments that contribute little, if
anything, to net global welfare (Harvard appears to have been particularly invested in hedge funds) and enable them to receive returns well
above those available to the average investor.61 The most prestigious
universities also accept “legacy” applicants (i.e., those whose parents or
grandparents attended the same institution) at rates three or four times
the rate of ordinary applicants, a sort of academic frequent flyer program that is driven almost exclusively by its fund-raising potential. This
is before one even reaches the enormous tax subsidy received by educational institutions or the extraordinary salaries paid to university officials, matters less central to Piketty’s argument but which are accessible
to any reader of a daily newspaper. The University of Pennsylvania
(Penn), the predominant university in Philadelphia, pays its President a
salary of more than $2 million,62 and I have seen Penn Police patrolling
the streets of West Philadelphia as if the university were a separate city,
which I suppose, in a sense, it is.
That universities preach social justice while maintaining an essentially feudal internal structure does not, of course, mean that they are
wrong or even especially hypocritical in doing so. (The medieval church
did more or less the same thing). Yet it is hard to escape that one reason academics favor higher taxes is that they know, deep down, that
such taxes will not hurt and may even help them, by knocking off (or at
least knocking down) potential competitors without really touching the
deeper, noneconomic advantages that they and their class possess.63 At
61

Id. at 447-52.
Seth Zweifler, Gutmann Salary Passes $2 Million Mark, THE DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Aug. 29, 2003), http://www.thedp.com/article/2013/08/gutmann-compensa
tion.
63 The suspicion that academics favor redistribution of income from self-interest
rather than ideology is an old one: a famous Yale professor is supposed to have teased his
students on this point on the first day of classes. Even if we disregard self-interest, there
is an inevitable tendency to downplay fears of concentrated political power, which is by
62
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the very least, their proposals would be more convincing if accompanied
by broader proposals for social and political equality: something many
academics do endorse, but all too many are silent about.
Which brings us back where we, and Piketty, started: to the French
Revolution and its implications for today’s world. The Revolution began with a tax crisis, when Louis XVI could not balance his budget and
called the Estates General to try to iron things out. The Estates General, which had traditionally voted separately by estate (clergy, nobles,
and everyone else), unexpectedly transformed itself into a National Assembly in which all voted together and the Third Estate, that is, ninetynine (or ninety-eight) percent of the population, eventually came to
dominate.64 People stopped bowing to the king and the king attached a
revolutionary cockade to this clothing. The rest – the fall of the Bastille,
the Reign of Terror, Napoleon, and so forth – is, as they say, history.65
As Piketty notes, the revolutionaries never completely resolved the
tax crisis, and the distribution of income remained more or less the same
as it was before the Revolution.66 What changed was the nature of society and the allocation of political power. Even after the Bourbons were
restored in 1815, they never really succeeded in repealing the Declaration of the Rights of Man, or in redividing society into formal estates that
had little or nothing to do with each other.67 As Simon Schama notes in
his eponymous book, the word citizen (citoyen) came into use for the
first time: first in France, then everywhere else.68 When France turned,
after World War II, to a more systematic attack on inequality, it was to
this conception of equality that it referred.
No one is (yet) calling for the king to be guillotined, and I haven’t
heard anyone propose a new tax on salt. Yet the lesson of 1789 remains
clear: everything is not economics, or at very least, economics cannot be
separated from underlying political and social arrangements. That
its nature difficult to quantify, as compared to concentrated economic power, which is at
least theoretically subject to measurement. Piketty’s proposals, which would tend to reduce concentrations of economic power but increase the political variety, are consistent
with this tradition. The experience of the European Union (EU), on which Piketty has,
to a significant degree, modeled his proposals, is a case in point. See generally JAMES
HEARTFIELD, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE END OF POLITICS (2013) (arguing that
the EU has resulted in government by bureaucrats and a widespread decline in political
participation); see also PIKETTY, supra note 3, at 571-77.
64 See PIKETTY, supra note 3, at 129.
65 For a more in-depth analysis of the French Revolution see generally SCHAMA,
supra note 1.
66 See PIKETTY, supra note 3, at 342.
67 See id.; SCHAMA, supra note 1, at 7-12.
68 See SCHAMA, supra note 1, at xv (“[A] patriotic culture of citizenship was created
in the decades after the Seven Years’ War” which was “a cause rather than a product of
the French Revolution.”).
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doesn’t mean that taxes don’t matter or that Piketty’s proposal is not
useful, at least as a starting point. (One of the revolutionaries’ first
moves was to repeal the tithe, a particularly hated tax that went to support a hated clerical bureaucracy.69). But it does mean that they are unlikely to be enough.
What I am arguing is not that Piketty is too radical, but that he is
perhaps not radical enough: that a genuine assault on inequality requires
a change in philosophy that cannot be captured by charts and graphs,
however stylish they are. Inequality is first and foremost a state of
mind, on the part of those at the top and frequently those at the bottom.
The expressions of inequality, from the rise of the Gini coefficient to
separate bathrooms for first class passengers, are manifestations of that
mindset rather than its essence. Those who believe it can be corrected
by raising taxes on someone else, while maintaining their own exemptions and privileges, are like the ministers in Louis XVI’s government
who thought they could resolve the financial crisis while maintaining the
existing social structure. They may write the first chapter, but they are
unlikely to finish the story. “J’avais reve’ d’une republique que tout le
monde eut adoree’,” wrote Camille Desmoulins before his execution, “I
dreamed of a republic that the whole world would love.”70 He was talking about more than taxes.

69

See id. at 316.
SCHAMA, supra note 1, at vii (frontispiece) (quoting a letter from Camille
Desmoulins to his wife from April 4, 1974). The quotation finds an odd resonance in the
famous song from the musical Les Miserables, although it is doubtful that audiences (and
perhaps the writers) were aware of this, particularly given that the English translation
makes it appear that the singer (Fantine) is upset because she has been betrayed by her
boyfriend rather than by God or by the Revolution, which in any case took place several
decades earlier. “J’avais reve’ [I dreamed a dream].”
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